Chile has been at the forefront of pension reform, having switched in 1980 from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully funded privatized accounts system. The Chilean system served as a model for reform in many other Latin American countries and has also been considered by U.S. policy makers as a possible prototype for social security reform. Some of the criticisms of the Chilean system are low coverage rates and contributions rates among certain segments of the population. In 2006, the Chilean government proposed some reforms aimed at increasing coverage and contribution rates and expanding the safety net provided by the system to poor households. This study evaluates how changes in pension system rules affect working behavior and pension contribution patterns using data from a new Chilean household survey administered in 2002 and 2004 linked with administrative data from the pension regulatory agency. It develops and estimates a dynamic model of decision-making about working in the covered or uncovered sectors of the economy and studies implications for pension accumulations. The estimated model is used to simulate behavior under different pension system rules, such as a change in the number of years of contributions required for the minimum pension or a change in pension plan fees.
Introduction
Many pay-as-you-go social security systems in the United States, Europe and some parts of Asia face impending insolvency due to rising numbers of pensioners per worker. Policy-makers are considering a number of potential reforms, one being a transition away from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully funded privatized retirements accounts system. Chile was at the forefront of social security reform when it replaced its pay-as-you-go system with a privatized accounts system in 1980.
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The Chilean system has since been a prototype for pension reform in many other Latin American countries, including Mexico, Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay.
Previous research on Chile finds substantial benefits from moving to a private retirement accounts system in terms of developing well-functioning capital markets and stimulating economic growth. However, there continues to be a heated debate about other relative merits of a decentralized, private accounts system vis-à-vis a more centralized system. Critics of the privatized system point to some problematic aspects, such as commissions and fees that some consider to be excessive. The system has also come under criticism because of low coverage rates and low rates of contributions among certain segments of the population.
In Chile, as in many other Latin American countries, there is a dual labor market with both covered and uncovered sector workers. In the covered sector, individuals sign labor market contracts, pay taxes, and, under law, are obliged to contribute 10% of their paycheck to the privatized pension 1 The adoption of the private accounts system was in part influenced by University of Chicago economists that were advisors to Augusto Pinochet's during his military regime.
accounts system and an additional percentage for health insurance, disability insurance and unemployment insurance. The uncovered sector consists of wage workers with no formal labor contracts and self-employed workers who are not required to contribute to the pension program under current Chilean law. Rates of contributing to the privatized pension program are low among uncovered sector workers.
The structure of the Chilean pension system can be described as a "threepillar public/private system," in the terminology of the World Bank (1994) .
This paragraph draws on a description of the pension system given in Arenas de Mesa et. al. (2006) .The first pillar is the public safety-net component that consists of a (i) means-tested welfare pension (pensiones asistenciales, or PASIS) for the poor, (ii) a state guaranteed minimum pension (MPG) for participants in the Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFPs, or pension fund managers) who have at least 20 years of contributions, and (iii) a public defined benefit system that administers the old PAYGO defined benefit program (closed since 1980 to new entrants). The second pillar of the pension system, which has received the most attention, consists of the mandatory defined contribution program known as the AFP system. This is a national savings program for all wage and salary workers that is intended to provide participants with old-age benefits (it also provides a life insurance and disability benefit as part of the mandatory program).
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The third pillar 2 When the new program was announced, existing workers were required to decide whether to remain in the old INP system or to move to the new system. Those who moved to the new system received credit for INP contributions known as a transferable Recognition Bond (RB). The new AFP system is mandatory for all new wage and salary workers joining the labor force as of 1981, but affiliation remains optional for self-employed workers.
of the Chilean pension system is a voluntary component, whereby affiliates who wish to pay more than the mandated pension contribution may do so, with their voluntary contributions receiving some tax benefits. Only a very small fraction of workers make contributions over the obligatory level.
In March 2006, the Chilean president, Michele Bachelet, appointed an independent commission of experts to study and propose improvements to the pension system, with the goals of increasing coverage and contribution rates. Two of the recommendations were to extend the state's safety net by reducing the required length of time needed to qualify for the minimum pension benefit guarantee and by increasing the amount of income allowed to qualify for the means-tested PASSIS program. A third recommendation was to make contributions mandatory for self-employed workers. Some of these proposed reforms were passed by Congress in January, 2008.
The aim of this paper is to study how individuals' labor force and pension contribution behavior is affected by the rules governing the system. We use a dynamic model of labor force sector participation, retirement and contribution patterns to study these effects. The dynamic model takes into account that individuals working in different labor market sectors face different wage processes, that future wage and preference shocks are uncertain at the time of making decisions, and that contributions rules differ for covered and uncovered sector workers. The model is estimated using data from from the 2002
Historia Laboral y Seguridad Social (HLLS ) survey and the 2004 Enquesta
Proteccion Sociale (EPS ) follow up survey. and labor market information on 17,246 individuals age 15 or older, including information on household characteristics, education, training and work history, pension plan participation, savings, as well as more limited information on health, assets, disability status and utilization of medical services. This study focuses on men, in part because many women do not work and to avoid the consideration of the timing of fertility decisions and they interact with working decisions. There are also extensive questions that are aimed at assessing financial literacy and eliciting individual's attitudes towards risk. We complement the survey data with linked administrative data on pension contributions and fees paid that we obtained from the pension fund regulatory agency, market data on the performance of various pension funds (their returns, costs and profits), and data on the fees/commissions of pension funds that were in operation at different points in time. Through the linking of the household demographic data to the administrative history of individual pension fund decisions, we are able to carry out a detailed micro-economic analysis of decision-making relevant to pension accumulations. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 provides more information on the Chilean pension system. Section 4 describes the dataset and presents descriptive statistics for the analysis sample. Section 5 presents the behavioral model and describes the solution and estimation method. Section 6 presents the estimation results and evidence on goodness of fit. Section 7 uses the estimated model to carry out several policy experiments related to changes in the rules governing the pension system and section 8 concludes.
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Literature Review
This work builds on previous studies that develop and estimate dynamic behavioral models for the purpose of studying how social security and pension rules affect labor supply and retirement behavior, most notably Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Rust and Phelan (1997), French (2002) , and Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005) . These studies use data from individuals whose retirement benefits are defined benefit not defined contribution. Under a defined benefit plan, the retirement benefits typically depend on age of retirement, an average of the past earnings and years of service. In a defined contribution scheme, such as that in Chile, the retirement benefits depend on contribution accumulations and investment returns.
An early paper by Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) develops and estimates a life-cycle model that they use to study how social security and pension benefits affect working and retirement behavior. Individuals may be working full-time, be partially retired or fully retired. The model includes the fact that individuals in partial retirement obtain a lower wage rate than those working full time. Once the model is estimated, it is used to simulate retirement behavior. The simulations of the percentages of individuals who are working full-time, partially retired, and fully retired are very similar to those observed in the data, with peaks in retirement percentages at age 62 and 65. These peaks occur because of effects that social security and pension benefits have on wages and on retirement behavior. Their paper was the first empirical study to treat each year as a separate period for obtaining optimal labor supply paths over the entire life cycle. In our paper we also obtain these 6 paths and examine how changes in retirement benefits affect labor decisions of young individuals. Rust and Phelan (1997) study how social security and Medicare affect retirement behavior when some individuals face borrowing constraints and do not have access to annuities and health insurance. They develop and estimate a dynamic programming model about individuals' decisions on labor supply and application for social security benefits that incorporates constraints imposed by incomplete markets and allows for uncertainty in future earnings.
They find that the peak in retirement at 62 is best explained by the borrowing constraints and that the peak at 65 is explained by incomplete markets on annuities and health insurance and the fact that, for those older than 65, Medicare is available after application for social security benefits.
Most recent empirical analysis of how social security regulations affects retirement behavior incorporate savings behavior and heterogeneity, for instance, French (2002) and Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005) . As opposed to the earlier literature, these authors use the estimated model to conduct various policy experiments to evaluate not only the effects on labor supply and retirement behavior of older workers but also on that of workers younger than 62 years old. Changes in the size of social security benefits and in the legal age of retirement are some of the policy experiments they conduct. French (2005) finds that the effects of those changes on working decisions of younger individuals are smaller than those of old workers. Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005) , who model the decisions of married and single individuals, find that, in general, the behavior of singles is more affected by those changes than that of married individuals. Although we do not incorporate 7 savings, outside of retirement savings in this paper, the model we use in this study also includes heterogeneity. As in the above two papers, we are very interested in evaluating the behavior of young individuals. The main difference between the models described above and the model used in this paper is that we model not only the labor supply decision but also the choice of informal and formal labor market and the contribution decision.
Most empirical studies of the Chilean pension system analyze aggregate and macro data. For instance Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995) use an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth and formal-informal production sectors to show how the privatization of the pension system explains the increasing private savings and rising growth. The authors suggest that switching from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully funded system creates incentives to move employment to the more efficient formal sector.
There are a few papers that use micro data, but mostly for descriptive That paper concludes that the average density 52% of months, which implies substantially lower replacement rates for representative individuals upon retirement than would a hypothetical contribution density of 80% as assumed in previous studies that forecast old-age pensions. In a subsequent paper, Arenas de Mesa et. al. (2006) use the same data linking information on contributions to the administrative records provided by the pension fund regulatory agency, which are the same administrative data used in this paper. They show that, over their lifetimes, men contribute more than women and self-reported payments indicate higher contribution levels than those observed in the contribution records. Also, they note that people usually do not contribute during periods of unemployment or self-employment. They also provide evidence that most workers know very little about the rules and regulations of the pension system.
Motivated by the findings in Arenas de Mesa et al (2004 Mesa et al ( , 2006 , we are interested in studying how pension investment decisions in Chile depend on pension system rules. In particular, we evaluate the effect of changing the rules of the system on employment in the covered sector and uncovered sector and on contribution decisions.
The Chilean Pension System
The new Chilean Pension System known as the "AFP system" is based on Early retirement is allowed, provided that the retiree can obtain a pension equal or greater than half his average earnings in the last 10 years and equal or greater than 1.1 times the minimum pension guaranteed by the State.
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Membership of the AFP system is mandatory for those individuals in the covered sector employed for the first time after January 1983 and voluntary for the self-employed. Individuals that started working before January 1983 5 The value of the UF as of December 2004 was $17,317 pesos (US$31) 6 At retirement, a member can choose from three pension payout options: 1) programmed withdrawals, the member keeps his savings in his individual account and withdraws annual amounts (in monthly payments). The AFP manages the account and recalculates the annual amount every year; 2) life annuity, the member purchases a life annuity from a life insurance company where his savings are transferred. The Company promises to make monthly payments until the death of the member; 3) temporary income with deferred life annuity, the member keeps part of his savings in his individual account and purchases a life annuity with the other part. He withdraws annual amounts until he starts to receive the life annuity. for the following reasons: 1) it is assumed that men can start contributing at 18, the age at which they should finish high school; 2) membership of the AFP system is mandatory for those entering the workforce for the first time after January 1983. By restricting the analysis to younger individuals, we ensure that these individuals never paid contributions into the old system, for which no records are available.
Descriptive Statistics
The sample used in the estimation of the model consists of 2,517 men between Tables 3 to 5 present average earnings, the average of accumulated quarters of work and contributions, the average percentage of time working, and the average density of contributions in both labor sectors by age groups. As shown in Table 3 , after-tax earnings in the covered sector are between 40%
and 50% greater than earnings in the uncovered sector for every age group. Table 4 shows that, although earnings are higher in the covered sector, the proportion of time working in the uncovered sector is greater than that in the covered sector at all ages. However, the difference between these proportions decreases with age. The group of individuals between 36 and 39 years old have accumulated more than 65 quarters of work in both sectors. Had they contributed every quarter, they would only need only 15 more quarters of contributions to be eligible for the minimum pension. However, this group has accumulated only 31.3 quarters of contribution on average. The density of contributions in the uncovered sector, where contributions are voluntary, is very low for every age group (see Table 5 ). It increases slightly with age, from 1.6% to 5.5%. signed a contract or self-employment jobs and The individual chooses how many quarters to work. In the covered sector he has to contribute the same number of quarters as he works. In the uncovered sector, the contribution decision is also assumed to be made by quarter; so he has to decide how many quarters to contribute from the quarters he works. Finally, it is assumed that an individual does not contribute when not working.
Each period a ≤ A, the individual chooses one of the mutually exclusive available combinations of labor and contribution decisions or retirement, k ∈ K a , to maximizes his remaining expected present discounted lifetime utility:
where Ω a denotes the space at age a, δ is the discount factor and D is the probability of dying next period.
The individual's utility function, at each age a, is given by:
The term C a represents the individual's consumption at age a. 
where w c a is the annual wage paid to the covered worker, w u a is the annual wage paid to the uncovered worker, and b is the unemployment benefit the worker receives when he does not work that year. Wage offers are sector-specific, w j , where j = c is covered and j = u is uncovered. The wage offer for an individual at age a is:
where ρ j is a sector-specific skill rental price, and K The amount of the pension at each age a depends on the account balance and an annuity factor that depends on age and marital status.
2) The account balance at the end of the period a is B a = (B a−1 + Γ a ) (1+ R), where Γ a is the amount of contributions during period a, and R represents the average annual rate of return of the pension fund which varies every year. 3) When the funds in the account are insufficient to finance the minimum pension set by the government, P M , the state guarantees the payment of the minimum pension to members that fulfill the requirement of 20 years of contribution (80 quarters).
4) The legal age of retirement for men is 65 years old, but retirees have the option to take early retirement provided that the pension is higher than half the average earnings in the last 10 years and higher than 1.1 times the minimum pension. 5) Individuals who are not members of any pension system have the right to get a basic pension, called PASIS
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, that is financed by the government.
To be eligible to get the PASIS the individual has to be at least 65 years old and have an average wage lower than twice the minimum pension amount.
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The size of the PASIS is half of the minimum pension.
The initial conditions of the model are years of education, E {0, 1, ..., 18}, and region of residence, G {0, 1}, which takes the value of 1 if the individual lives in the metropolitan area. The state variables at age a are the initial conditions of the model plus age, year, previous marital status, previous health status, years of work experience in each labor market sector, quarters of contribution, balance in the individual account, average wage of last ten years, and the vector of shocks a . We denote the state space at age a by Ω a ,
The age-varying shocks to consumption, leisure, the wage offer in the covered sector, the wage offer in the uncovered sector, and the rate of return are assumed to be iid with mean zero, jointly normally distributed, and serially uncorrelated.
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Additionally, the vector of unobserved individualspecific factors is assumed to be independently distributed from the vector of stochastic shocks.
10 PASIS stands for Pension Asistencial (welfare pension) 11 To be eligible for the PASIS individuals have to have an income less than 50% of the minimum pension or no income at all. Here the eligibility depends on the level of the average wage in the last ten years 12 There are also implicit shocks to the probabilities of marriage and bad health, which are assumed to be independently distributed from the explicit shocks considered.
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The functional forms for the utility, the wage offers, and the probabilities of being in bad health and of getting married are described in Appendix A.
Model Solution
The model is solved by backwards recursion, starting from the last period the individual makes decisions, A, to the initial period a 0 . It is assumed that everyone retires by age 70. The terminal value is the discounted value of the remaining lifetime utility, which depends on the pension and therefore on the state space at age of retirement.
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At period A − 1, the individual chooses the option that maximizes his period utility plus the terminal value given the state space Ω A−1 . Then at period A − 2, he calculates the alternative value functions, integrating over the distribution of the shocks at period A − 1, for every option and every point in the state space, that is, the expected value next period A − 1 given the decision k ∈ K A−2 and every state point in Ω A−2 . This is called the Emax function Wolpin (1994, 1997 
)).
It is not possible to calculate the expected value for every point in the state space given its size and because some of the state variables are continuous,and the model does not have a closed-form solution. We therefore obtain a numerical solution using an approximation method to obtain the value of the Emax function as proposed in Wolpin (1994, 1997) .
The values computed at a subset of points of the state space are used to approximate the Emax function by a polynomial in the state variables. To calculate the expected value we use Monte Carlo integration. 14 13 It is assumed that individuals discount their utility until they are 85 years old. 14 The model is solved using 2,600 state space points and 40 draws for the shocks. 
Model Estimation
The parameters of the model are estimated using the Simulated Maximum 
}.
The likelihood for the sample of I individuals observed from their initial
Because the type is assumed to be known by the individual but unobserved by the econometrician, it is integrated out. We also assume that the initial conditions are exogenous conditional on type. The sample likelihood is:
where P µ t |Ω a i 0 is the probability of individual i of being of type t. These 22 type probabilities are functions of the initial conditions and are also estimated.
Due to the shocks' serial independence assumption, the probability of observing the outcomes up to some age given the initial conditions and the type t for an individual i can be written as:
In the calculations of the probabilities it is necessary to integrate over the shocks to to consumption, leisure, the wage offer in the covered sector, the wage offer in the uncovered sector, and the rate of return. A difficulty that has to be considered in calculating the likelihood is that some of the wages are missing in the data. However, for those who work the utility of working in the uncovered sector is higher than that of working in the covered sector (θ 10 > 0).
There is a positive effect of work experience on wage offers in both labor sectors; however, the effect is more important in the covered sector than in the uncovered sector. Moreover, having worked in the covered sector has a very small effect on wages offered in the uncovered sector. The estimates about region of residence imply that living in the metropolitan area has a higher positive effect on wage offers in the uncovered sector than on those in the covered sector.
The probability of marriage increases with age and years of education, although the positive relationship with age is stronger than that with years of education. Regarding the probability of being in bad health, age has a positive effect and education has a negative effect.
Model Goodness of Fit and Base-Line Model Statistics
This section presents the model's goodness of fit to the data. As noted earlier, the model is estimated using data on men at ages 18-39. The model fits the data well in several dimensions as shown in, Tables 6 to 9. Table 6 presents the comparison of the average accumulated number of quarters of work per sector by groups of age. The model predicts quarters of work very well, although the predictions are slightly higher than those observed in the data for the covered sector and slightly lower than those observed for the uncovered sector. The predictions of accumulated quarters not working are also higher than in the data. For age groups starting at 40 years old, only simulated data are available. Table 7 shows how the model fits the data on accepted annual wages by sector. The average predicted wages are close to actual wages for all age groups used in the estimation. Table 8 presents the fit to the accumulated quarters of contribution. The model fits the patterns of quarters of contribution in the uncovered sector fairly well. However, the simulated accumulations for older ages are constant in that sector. For the covered sector, the model predicts slightly higher accumulations than those observed in the data. Table 9 shows the model's fit of the proportion of married men and of men in bad health. The model predicts very well the proportion married for all the age groups. The predictions for the proportion of men in bad health in the third group of age are slightly higher than that observed in the data, although the difference is small. In the other groups the predicted probability is the same as in the data. It is of policy interest to asses the impact of changing the rules regarding the Minimum Pension benefit. We use the estimated model to evaluate the impact on employment and contribution patterns of changes in the Minimum Pension rules similar to those already approved by the Congress at the beginning of this year. Individual decisions on labor participation and contribution to the pension are simulated under alternative scenarios. We focus on the effects on the decisions of individuals in the age range of our sample, for which the simulations would be expected to be most reliable.
Years of contributions required to get the Minimum Pension
Fiest we study the effect of changes in the quarters of contributions required to be eligible to obtain the Minimum pension. Table 10 compares the simulated accumulated quarters of work in both sectors for three different numbers of quarters required to be eligible to obtain the minimum pension: 80 (baseline), 60 and 40. The magnitude of the effects is greatest for younger people. For instance, the number of accumulated quarters of covered work for those at ages 18-25 increases from 3.9 to 4.1 when the requirement goes down to 60 quarters and from 3.9 to 4.3 when the requirement is 40 quarters.
On the other hand, the accumulated quarters of work in the covered sector for those ages 60-64 increases only from 72.7 to 73.7 and from 72.7 to 75.2 respectively. Therefore, decreasing the number of quarters of contributions required to get the minimum pension from 80 to 60, that is, by 25%, increases work of the youngest group of individuals in the covered sector by 5% and when that requirement is lowered from 80 to 40 quarters, that is 50% lower, their work increases 10%. In the other groups of age there are also increases in the accumulated quarters of work in the covered sector.
According to the simulations, the number of quarters of work in the uncovered sector does not drop as much as it rises in the covered sector, which implies that the observed response does not only come from individuals moving from the uncovered to the covered labor sector. In fact, most of the effect is explained by a decrease in the number of quarters individuals stay at home. Table 11 shows the effect of reducing the number of quarters required to get the minimum pension on contributions from 80 to 60 or 40. Because it is mandatory to contribute while working in the covered sector, the effect on contributions in the covered sector is the same as the one described above for work in that sector. The effect on contributions in the uncovered sector for young people, the first three groups of age, is interesting. Even when work in that sector decreases, the quarters of contributions increases. When the requirement changes from 80 to 60 quarters, there is an increase of more than 30% and when it changes to 40 quarters, accumulated contributions increase by more than 70%. Although the number of quarters of contributions in the uncovered sector is small, a change in the number of quarters required to get the minimum pension has important effects on the contribution decision. 
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Size of the Minimum Pension
To measure the impact of changing the size of the Minimum Pension on employment and contribution decisions, we first increase it by 25% from $800, 000 pesos to $1, 000, 000 pesos and then by 50% to 1, 200, 000 pesos. In these policy experiments, we still required 80 quarters of contributions to be eligible to get the minimum pension. Table 12 presents the effect of changing the size of the minimum pension on the accumulated quarters of work. Work in the covered sector increases when the size of the minimum pension is higher, especially for young men.
By ages 33-39, an individual has accumulated 2.8 more quarters of work in the covered sector when the minimum pension is 25% higher and 7.9 more quarters when the minimum pension is 50% higher. Work in the uncovered sector decreases by a small amount. The accumulated quarters of contributions in the uncovered sector increase steadily for young individuals as observed in Table 13 . At ages 33-39 a worker accumulates 4.6 more quarters of contributions when the size of the minimum pension increases 25% and accumulates 13.7 more quarters of contributions when the minimum pension increased by 50%. In the last case, the accumulation of contributions is almost 5 times higher than in the baseline. To assess the impact of changing commissions on employment and contributions, we simulate the effect of lowering the commission from 2.5% to 2.0% and then to 1.5%. As can be observed in Table 14 the effect on work decisions of changes in commissions is very small. There is a positive effect on work in the covered sector, but even decreasing fees by 1% increases the accumulated quarters of covered work by less than one quarter. The effect in the uncovered sector is negative but of the same magnitude as that in the covered sector. As Table 15 shows that lowering the percentage commission has a very small positive effect on accumulated contributions. Although small, that effect on contributions in the uncovered sector is higher for young individuals when the commission is decreased from 2.5% to 1.5%. 
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Conclusions
Many pay-as-you-go pension systems are facing impending insolvency and transitioning to a fully funded pension system is one policy option. The
Chilean Pension System has received much attention from researchers and policy makers because Chile was the first country that switched from a payas-you-go pension system to a private one based on individual capitalization.
In the new system, contributions are deposited in individual accounts that are managed by the Pension Fund Managers (AFPs). The AFP system has come under some criticism, because more than half of the workforce is not currently contributing, especially the self-employed for whom contribution is voluntary and younger workers who tend to stay at home or work in the uncovered sector. The AFP system adopted several recent reforms that are designed to increase coverage rates and extend the state safety net.
We For those individuals age 18-40, when the required number of quarters of contributions is decreased by 25%, the accumulated number of quarters of work in the covered sector increases between 3 and 5% and the accumulated quarters of contributions increase between 30 and 40%. Moreover, when that required number is decreased by 50%, covered work increases between 6 and 10% and accumulated contributions paid while in the uncovered sector increase between 70 and 85%. The effect on contributions while in the covered sector is the same as that on covered work because it is mandatory to contribute there. Thus, decisions to work in the covered sector are sensitive to the minimum requirements for a minimum pension.
With respect to changing the size of the minimum pension we find that when the size of the minimum pension is increased by 25%, the accumulated quarters of work in the covered sector increases between 10 and 20% and the accumulated quarters of contributions in the uncovered sector increases by more than 100%. The impact of increasing the size of the minimum pension by 50% is even higher. Accumulated quarters of work in the covered sector increases between 30 and 60% and accumulated quarters of contribution in the uncovered sector increase by around 4 times.
Two of the main goals of reforming the Chilean Individual Account Pension System were to increase contribution in the informal sector and to encourage labor market participation of young people. According to the results of the policy experiments, both reducing the quarters of contributions required to get the minimum pension and increasing the size of the minimum pension would be expected to have a significant positive effect both on work in the covered sector and on contributions in the uncovered sector. 
